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Licensees and Economic Interest in
Minerals After Swank and Revenue
Ruling 83-160*
By MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
Slightly over three years have elapsed since the decision
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Swank.' In that
decision the Court held that a coal operator mining a coal de-
posit under a written lease terminable without cause on thirty
days prior notice held an economic interest in the mineral in
place.2 Accordingly, the lessee-coal operator was entitled to
claim the percentage depletion allowance deduction.' Swank
* Copyright 0 1984 by Martin J. McMahon, Jr.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1971, Rutgers Col-
lege; J.D. 1974, Boston College; LL.M. 1979, Boston University.
1 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
Id. at 577-85. The term "economic interest" was first used by the Supreme
Court in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933). The definition, derived from
Palmer, along with subsequent judicial gloss, has been incorporated into the Treasury
Regulations as follows:
Annual depletion deductions are allowed only to the owner of an economic
interest in mineral deposits .... An economic interest is possessed in every
case in which the taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in min-
eral in place . . . and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income
derived from the extraction of the mineral. . . to which he must look for a
return of his capital .... A person who has no capital investment in the
mineral deposit or standing timber does not possess an economic interest
merely because through a contractual relation he possesses a mere economic
or pecuniary advantage derived from producton. For example, an agree-
ment between the owner of an economic interest and another entitling the
latter to purchase or process the product upon production or entitling the
latter to compensation for extraction ... does not convey a depletable eco-
nomic interest. Further, depletion deductions with respect to an economic
interest of a corporation are allowed to the corporation and not to its
shareholders.
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309, 317.
Because the precision of the definition in the regulation is an illusion, the true
story of the definition of the economic interest concept is a tale of ever-continuing
litigation. See Sneed, The Economic Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 TEx. L.
REv. 307 (1957).
3 451 U.S. at 584-85. See I.R.C. § 611 (1982) (allowing a deduction for depletion
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rebuffed an argument advanced by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice that so called "short-notice terminability" was invariably
fatal to the taxpayer's claim of an economic interest.4
The Swank decision generated some notice in tax litera-
ture, largely because it rejected a position vigorously asserted
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) for over
twenty years.5 But, because the issue was framed by the Court
in narrow terms, most commentators looked at Swank as
merely deciding the precise issue involved-whether an unex-
ercised thirty day termination clause would vitiate an other-
wise valid economic interest.' Some commentators, including
this author, believed the long range impact of the theoretical
underpinnings of the Swank decision could not be so con-
fined.7 Although there has not yet been sufficient time for ex-
pansive judicial reexamination of the definition of an eco-
nomic interest based upon the ramifications of Swank, the
impact of Swank is beginning to be felt.
Recently, the IRS acknowledged that the holding of
Swank is not confined only to its particular facts." In Revenue
Ruling 83-160, the IRS held that the terminability of a min-
eral lease at the will of the lessor "is not an essential criterion
that, by itself, will preclude a taxpayer from acquiring an eco-
nomic interest."" This ruling goes beyond Swank in conclud-
ing that there is no minimum period during which a lessee
must have a legal right to extract minerals as a necessary pre-
with respect to "mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber"); I.R.C.
§ 613 (1982) (providing for percentage depletion allowance deduction).
" For a discussion of the history of the litigation of the terminable lease cases,
see Lathrop, Short-Notice Termination Clauses in Coal Leases: Effect on Percentage
Depletion, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 159 (1980); McMahon, Defining the "Economic Inter-
est" in Minerals After United States v. Swank, 70 Ky. L.J. 23, 52-60 (1981-82).
1 See, e.g., Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571, 582-83 (1967) (court agreed
with the Commissioner that a lessee did not have an economic interest in minerals
mined under a lease terminable on short notice).
6 See, e.g., Henshaw & Minor, Short-Notice Terminability No Bar to Lessee
Mineral Depletion, Says Sup. Ct. in Swank, 55 J. TAX'N 102 (1981); Note, Percent-
age Depletion Allowance Not Dependent on Duration of Lease Interest Tax Law, 22
NAT. RESOURCES J. 239 (1982); Note, Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation: 1980
Term, 35 TAX LAW. 443, 540-50 (1981).
7 See McMahon, supra note 4, at 67-68.
6 See Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99.
9 Id. at 100.
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requisite to an economic interest. As a result, the rationale of
Swank is not limited to leases terminable only upon the thirty
day notice period presented by the facts of that case. Seem-
ingly flying in the face of Revenue Ruling 83-160, however, is
Revenue Ruling 84-88,10 which cited the fact that a percent-
age of sales contract miner had acquired the right to mine a
coal deposit to exhaustion as a relevant factor in holding that
he had an economic interest in the deposit.
While Revenue Ruling 83-160, like the Swank decision, is
by its express language intended to be narrowly confined in its
impact, the reasoning behind the ruling, as is true with
Swank, cannot logically be so confined. If the ruling is concep-
tually correct, further changes in the definition of an eco-
nomic interest should follow. Also, if that ruling is correct, the
holding of Revenue Ruling 84-88 is subject to an erroneous
qualification. The purpose of this Article is to assess the im-
pact of Revenue Ruling 83-160 on the definition of "an eco-
nomic interest in minerals" and to examine the proposition
that-after Swank and Revenue Ruling 83-160-licensees,
who previously were generally considered not to have acquired
an economic interest, should now be found to have an eco-
nomic interest in the mineral deposit that they are
extracting. 1
I. TERMINABLE LEASES BEFORE Swank
That a lessee of a mineral deposit has an economic inter-
est in the deposit has been beyond question since the 1925
decision of the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens
Co.12 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Parsons v.
Smith,13 the IRS generally did not assert that a lessee did not
have an economic interest in minerals acquired under a lease
terminable by the lessor on short notice and without cause. In
"0 1984-25 I.R.B. 13.
11 This article is a sequel to my article in note 4 supra. My earlier article dis-
cussed the difficulties which before Revenue Ruling 83-160 were present in any at-
tempt to identify the presence of an economic interest. See McMahon, supra note 4,
at 23.
12 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
13 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
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that case the Court held that contract miners receiving a fixed
fee for each ton of coal extracted did not have an economic
interest in the coal in place.14 Among the factors cited by the
Court as the basis for its holding was that "the contracts were
completely terminable without cause on short notice."' 5
After the decision in Parsons, the IRS began to assert
vigorously that short notice terminability vitiated an other-
wise valid economic interest acquired by a lessee.16 Previously,
the Service had used this factor to argue that a taxpayer did
not have an economic interest only with contract miners, or
nominal lessees who were in substance contract miners be-
cause they were under a contractual obligation to sell the ex-
tracted coal to the lessor. 17 In the case of contract miners, this
argument can be traced back to G.C.M. 26290,18 promulgated
in 1950. Prior to Parsons, however, the Service had not gener-
ally attempted to apply this argument to lessees.
The basic thrust of the Commissioner's argument in the
terminable lease cases was that the lessee under a short notice
termination lease had only a mere "economic advantage" de-
rived from extraction of coal under the lease."9 This distinc-
tion between an "economic advantage" and an economic in-
terest is based on Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co.20 In that
decision the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer processing
casinghead gas to remove the oil under contracts with the well
owner did not have an economic interest.21 After examining
the taxpayer's relationship to the gas in place, the Court con-
cluded the taxpayer had no "investment" in the gas in place
14 Id. at 225-26.
' Id. at 225.
18 See McMahon, supra note 4, at 52-53.
17 See id. at 44-53. See, e.g., Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. v. Commissioner,
231 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1956); Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1955);
Eastern Coal Corp. v. Yoke, 67 F. Supp. 166 (N.D. W. Va. 1946).
8 G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42, 44-46, declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 70-277,
1970-1 C.B. 280.
1" See, e.g., Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594, 601 (1979); Winters Coal Co.
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 249 (1971), rev'd, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974); Whitmer v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480 (1969), afid, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971); Mul-
lins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571, 579 (1967).
20 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
21 Id. at 368.
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and, accordingly, no economic interest.22
An actual investment in terms of a capital expenditure
has, however, never been a requisite for an economic interest.
In Palmer v. Bender,23 the landmark case from which the defi-
nition of an economic interest was born, the Court found an
"investment" in the absence of actual capital expenditure. 4
The taxpayer was held to have an investment arising from
"complete legal control of the oil in place. '2 5 An actual
financial investment in the mineral in place, such as a
purchase of a royalty interest, clearly gives rise to an eco-
nomic interest.26 The history of the development of the con-
cept of economic interest reveals that an economic interest
can also be obtained by making a valuable contribution to the
acquisition or development of the deposit.2 7 Frequently, this
"contribution" has entailed the ability to exercise legal control
over the mineral in place.28 Absent either such a contribution
22 Id. at 367.
23 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
", See id. at 558-59.
25 Id. at 558. Nevertheless, in many cases courts continue to seek an actual cash
"investment" by the taxpayer in the minerals in place or in connection with the min-
erals. See, e.g., Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d at 1000-01 (lessee pur-
chased surface rights); Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 605 (lessee incurred devel-
opment expenses); Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 407, 416-
19 (1974) (investment in riparian land essential to dredging sand and gravel under
license). In other cases, however, the courts have found an investment to be insuffi-
cient where the taxpayer's investment was in equipment associated with extraction or
processing. See, e.g., Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. at 224-25 (movable equipment);
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. at 368 (processing plant); McCall v. Commis-
sioner, 312 F.2d 699, 704-06 (4th Cir. 1963) (movable equipment). Some courts have
decided that the investment requirement has not been met when the taxpayer's ex-
penditures were recoverable through deductions other than the depletion allowance.
See, e.g., 312 F.2d at 705 (deductible development expenses, depreciable
improvements).
26 See, e.g., Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655, 661 (1937) (quoting Palmer v.
Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1933)).
27 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 316-17
(1956) (net profits interest received for use of land from which to whipstock drill for
offshore oil deposits is an economic interest); Omer v. United States, 329 F.2d 393
(6th Cir. 1964) (royalty received in consideration of surface rights was economic inter-
est); Cline v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 889 (1977), afl'd, 617 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1980)
(royalty received in consideration of negotiating mineral lease was economic interest);
Rev. Rul. 77-84, 1977-1 C.B. 173.
2" The significance of control over the deposit is best illustrated by Commis-
sioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308. In that case the Supreme Court
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72
or an actual capital investment a taxpayer could not have an
economic interest, but merely an economic advantage.29
In all of the terminable lease cases decided by the Tax
Court, lessees under leases terminable on short notice were
found not to have an economic interest.30 Clearly, if a lease
could be terminated on nominal notice, the lessee's control
over the deposit, when viewed prospectively, is illusory.3' Al-
though the Commissioner generally took the position that a
lease terminable on less than one year's prior notice was to be
considered terminable on short notice,3 2 the Tax Court fo-
cused on whether the notice period was sufficiently long to en-
able the lessee to extract a significant amount of the mineral
in place after notice was given, but prior to the termination
date. 3 If so, the notice period was not nominal and did not
held that a littoral land owner held an economic interest in an offshore oil deposit in
which the taxpayer neither made an actual financial investment nor held an interest
as an owner or lessee. Under California law, offshore oil deposits could be extracted
only from wells drilled on land. The taxpayer received a net profits royalty in consid-
eration for granting the holder of the working interest the right to whipstock drill
from its land. Id. at 310-11. Because of the taxpayer's unique control over extraction
of the mineral, the Supreme Court found that the taxpayer had made an "indispensa-
ble contribution ... in return for a share of the net profits," and held that the tax-
payer had an economic interest entitling him to claim the depletion allowance. Id. at
317. See also Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d at 1001 (lessee under lease
terminable on short notice without cause who had acquired surface rights had an
economic interest).
29 The requisite "investment" may be made in an indirect manner, however. For
example, a lawyer who receives a royalty interest in a mineral deposit in considera-
tion of providing legal services in connection with the examination of title and prepa-
ration of the lease document has an economic interest in the deposit with respect to
the royalty. Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16. As a result of the receipt of the royalty,
under I.R.C. § 83(a) (1984), the lawyer recognizes income equal to the fair market
value of the royalty interest. Id. Cf. G.C.M 22272, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 221-22.
30 See, e.g., Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594; Winters Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 249; Whitmer v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480; Mullins v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571 (1967). See also Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415
(1975) (terminable, nonexclusive license); Smoot v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 1038
(1932) (terminable license). See generally McMahon, supra note 4, at 52-60.
31 See Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 609.
2 See G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42, 45-46, declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 70-
277, 1970-1 C.B. 280.
33 See 72 T.C. at 594. In Weaver the Tax Court held that a taxpayer had no
economic interest in a sand and gravel deposit leased subject to termination by the
lessor at will, without cause, but that he did have an economic interest in another
deposit with respect to which his lease was terminable without cause on 120 days
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vitiate an economic interest.
Although the Tax Court and the IRS arrived at different
views of the minimum notice period required to find an eco-
nomic interest in the lessee, the theory used by each was the
same. In Revenue Ruling 74-506 the IRS held that where a six
month period was sufficient to enable the taxpayer to remove
all of the remaining materials, a mineral lease with a six
month term was sufficient to confer an economic interest on
the lessee. 4 Although the facts of the ruling indicated that all
remaining minerals could have been removed during the term,
the ruling specifically stated that a term which permitted the
lessee to remove a substantial amount of the mineral would be
sufficient to find an economic interest.35 This was in accord
with the Tax Court view. 6
Under the IRS view, abstract legal rights, as opposed to
actual conduct of the parties, were talismanic. Thus, in Reve-
nue Ruling 77-341 the Service held that a lessee did not have
an economic interest under an oral lease that was unenforce-
able under the Kentucky Statute of Frauds, notwithstanding
the fact that the lessee had mined coal and paid royalties for a
period in excess of one year.3 Since the contract was unen-
forceable, the lessee had not acquired a legal interest in the
coal and, accordingly, did not have an economic interest. A
similar result was reached in Revenue Ruling 77-481.38 In that
ruling the taxpayer had entered into a mineral lease for the
removal of rock which was coterminous with the taxpayer's
contract to supply rock to a governmental agency. The IRS
held that the taxpayer did not have an economic interest be-
cause the taxpayer had no enforceable right to extract a sub-
stantial portion of the deposit. His right to extract the rock
could be terminated at any time by cancellation of the con-
tract to supply rock by the government agency.
Prior to Swank, Revenue Rulings concluding that a lessee
prior notice. Id.
34 Rev. Rul. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B. 178.
35 Id.
36 Compare Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571 with Rev. Rul. 74-506, 1974-2
C.B. 178.
37 Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B. 204.
38 1977-2 C.B. 205.
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did have an economic interest relied specifically on the fact
that the lease was terminable neither at will nor upon short or
nominal notice.3 9 Other than the six month lease described in
Revenue Ruling 74-506 which was of a duration sufficient to
exhaust the deposit,40 the shortest lease term recognized by
the Service as conferring an economic interest on the lessee
was one year. Revenue Ruling 74-507 held that a lessee min-
ing operator had an economic interest under a one year lease
commencing on January 1 and automatically continued for
successive one year terms unless cancelled, with or without
cause, at the end of any term by notice due ten days prior to
November 1 of the current lease year.41 Although the period
between notice and the earliest possible termination of the
lease was only sixty-one days, the shortest possible lease term
was one year.
While the Commissioner's view prevailed in the short no-
tice terminable lease cases decided by the Tax Court and the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals,42 the Court of Claims and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that lessees under such
leases did have an economic interest.43 In Bakertown Coal Co.
v. United States44 and Swank v. United States,45 the Court of
Claims held that short notice termination clauses were irrele-
vant when the lessor did not exercise his right to terminate
the lease and the taxpayer in fact extracted the mineral.46 The
Court of Claims specifically noted that if the lessee were de-
nied an economic interest, no one would be allowed a deple-
tion deduction with respect to the gross income from the ex-
traction and sale of the coal.47 Under the Court of Claims view
the legal rights of the lessee were not as important as the fact
39 See Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310; Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301.
40 Rev. Rul. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B. 178, 179.
41 Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179.
42 See, e.g., Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594; Whitmer v. Commissioner, 28
T.C.M. (CCH) 1480 (1969), afl'd, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971).
43 See, e.g., Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974);
Swank v. United States, 602 F.2d 348 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), a f'd, 451 U.S. 571
(1981); Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. C1. 1973).
44 485 F.2d 633.
45 602 F.2d 348.
48 602 F.2d at 350; 485 F.2d at 640-41.
47 602 F.2d at 351; 485 F.2d at 642.
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that the lessee had actually extracted and sold a substantial
amount of minerals.48
II. THE Swank Decision
In United States v. Swank49 the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Claims and thus rejected the posi-
tion of the Commissioner."0 The lessees in Swank mined coal
under leases terminable without cause on thirty days prior no-
tice. All of the lessees operated continuously under the leases.
The Court held that the thirty days prior notice termination
clause, standing alone, did not void an otherwise valid eco-
nomic interest.51 Parsons v. Smith52 and Paragon Jewel Coal
Co. v. Commissioner51 were distinguished as involving miners
who, having neither rights to sell the coal to a third party af-
ter extraction nor any interest in the coal prior to its extrac-
tion, had no rights to share in the value of the mineral de-
posit.54 The lessees in Swank, however, had a legal interest in
the mineral both before and after it was extracted and were
free to sell the coal at the market price. The Court concluded
that the lessee's interest was not a mere economic
advantage. 55
The Court also rejected the government's argument that,
as a matter of practical economics, only the lessor held an eco-
nomic interest. Although several rationales were stated, in-
cluding the Court's conclusion that "practical economics" did
not dictate that the lessor would terminate the lease to seek a
higher royalty anytime the price of coal increased, the heart of
the Court's decision lay in policy analysis .5 The Court recog-
nized that the percentage depletion deduction is not a cost
48 See 485 F.2d at 642.
4- 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
50 Id. at 585.
51 Id.
52 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
" 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
451 U.S. at 583. The Court noted: "[I]t seems clear that the contract miners'
interest in the Parsons and Paragon Jewel cases would have been insufficient even if
their agreements had been for a fixed term." Id.
58 Id.
58 See id. at 584.
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recovery provision, but rather a special incentive to encourage
the extraction of natural resources.57 Accordingly, the Court
found no logical policy reason for entitlement to the depletion
allowance to turn on "whether the entire operation is con-
ducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a series
of taxpayers operating for successive shorter periods. 58 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that the policy behind the percent-
age depletion deduction would be frustrated by a decision de-
nying the depletion deduction to the lessee, because then no
one would be entitled to depletion on the gross income from
the sale of the coal extracted by the taxpayer.5 9 In this respect
the Court again distinguished Swank from Parsons and Para-
gon Jewel Coal Co.6 0
It was not immediately clear whether the Swank decision
merely established a safe harbor, where a lessee would have
an economic interest under a lease terminable without cause
on not less than thirty days notice, provided the lease was not
terminated, or whether Swank completely eliminated termi-
nability as a factor in determining whether a taxpayer had an
economic interest. Although the Court did not expressly state
that the latter was the rule, the Court's language certainly in-
dicated that terminability was simply not to be considered at
all:
If the authorization of a special tax benefit for mining a
seam of coal to exhaustion is sound policy, that policy would
seem equally sound whether the entire operation is con-
ducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a se-
ries of taxpayers operating for successive shorter periods.
The Government has suggested no reason why the efficient
removal of a great quantity of coal in less than 30 days
should have different tax consequences than the slower re-
moval of the same quantity over a prolonged period."'
" Id. at 576. See also Commissioner v. Engle, - U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 597, 605
(1984) (The purpose of I.R.C. § 613A (1984) is to "subsidize the combined efforts of
small producers and royalty owners in the exploration and production of the nation's
oil and gas resources.").
58 451 U.S. at 585.
'1 Id. at 578-79.
60 Id. at 580-83.
61 Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
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In a footnote to this passage, the Court further stated:
As we have indicated, the depletion deduction is geared to
the depletion of the mineral in place, and not to the tax-
payer's capital investment. Therefore, we can perceive no
reason to impose duration requirements on the availability
of the deduction for taxpayers who admittedly otherwise
have an "economic interest" in the coal, are dependent on
the market to recover their costs, and are actually depleting
the mineral in place.62
Despite the dissent's assertion in Swank that even after
Swank a lease for only one day would clearly not confer an
economic interest on the lessee,"3 that conclusion is not clear
in light of the above quoted passages. The language in the
footnote indicates the total abandonment of any durational
requirement.
Nevertheless, after Swank it was possible to argue that a
lessee under a lease terminable at will still could not have an
economic interest. A lessee under a lease terminable on thirty
days notice could be found to have an interest in minerals in
the ground since, even following notice of termination, the
lessee would have the right to continue extracting minerals for
thirty days. 4 A lessee under a lease terminable at will, how-
ever, could be said to have no interest in the minerals in the
ground since, following notice, he would have no right to con-
tinue extraction for any period of time. This being so, it could
be said that his interest in the minerals, in substance, would
arise only at the moment of extraction. 5
82 Id. at 585 n.25.
63 Id. at 594 (White, J., dissenting).
6C Cf. Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979) (economic interest present if
notice period sufficient to allow extraction of significant amount of minerals in place
after notice).
'" Cf. Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415 (1975) (a licensee has no interest in
the mineral until he extracts it); Caledonian Coal Co. v. Rocky Cliff Coal Mining Co.,
120 P. 715 (N.M. 1911). Under property law, however, one of the legal characteristics
of a lease is that it is a possessory interest. Thus, if the conveyance is in the form of a
lease, from a property law viewpoint the lessee has a present possessory interest in
the mineral in the ground, subject to the possibility of termination. See 3 ROCKY
MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING 269-70 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as AMERICAN LAW OF MINING]. Nevertheless, even property law recog-
nizes the doctrine of substance over form on occasion, and a document in the form of
1983-84]
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III. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER Swank
There have been no judicial decisions applying the princi-
ples of the Swank decision to significantly further expand the
definition of economic interest.6 6 O'Connor v. Commissioner, "7
decided by the Tax Court in 1982, was the first decision in-
volving the determination of an economic interest that cited
Swank. Although the court in O'Connor noted the Swank
Court's acknowledgment that the percentage depletion deduc-
tion "implements the congressional intent to encourage the
business of exploring, extracting, and producing natural re-
sources, 68 this was not crucial to the decision in O'Connor.
Despite the court's conclusion that an analysis of the cases
involving economic interest revealed that an entrepreneurial
type risk was a key element in determining whether a tax-
payer had an economic interest, 9 the court's decision that the
lessor of a clay deposit had leased, not sold, the clay in the
ground and that the lessee had obtained an economic interest
could have easily been reached through more traditional anal-
ysis. 70 The lease in this case ran for a term of seven years,71 so
there was no terminability issue raised and no need to apply
Swank, let alone build upon it using a policy analysis.
a lease may be recharacterized as a mere license. See Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 64
S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1951).
"6 In L.W. Hardy Co. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 465 (1982), the Commissioner
asserted that a taxpayer mining turquoise under a license did not have an economic
interest in the mineral. The court cited Swank with reference to the government's
argument, apparently for the proposition that without an economic interest a deple-
tion deduction is not allowed. See id. at 465. The court never reached this issue be-
cause it determined the taxpayer's books and records were inadequate to allow the
computation of any depletion deduction. Id. at 465-66.
Swank was cited tangentially in Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 867 (1981), for
the proposition that terminability is only a factor in determining the substance of a
lessee's interest. Id. at 874. Ridder did not involve an economic interest in minerals,
but rather a claim by a noncorporate lessor that he was not denied the investment tax
credit by I.R.C. § 46(3)(3)(B). Id. at 875. See also Xerox Corp. v. United States, 656
F.2d 659, 667 n.16 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (similar to Ridder).
67 78 T.C. 1 (1982).
68 Id. at 7 (citing United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981)).
08 See id.
70 See id. at 10-11 (lessee's obligation was conditioned on (1) lessor's clay meet-
ing specifications; (2) feasibility of mining the clay; and (3) the requirements of
lessee's plants).
71 Id. at 4.
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The Internal Revenue Service initially took a cautious ap-
proach to applying Swank. In a 1982 private letter ruling, the
Service took the position that Swank was based significantly
on the premise that the lessee had a legal interest in the coal
prior to extraction.7" The unexercised termination clause did
not vitiate the interest itself. Since the taxpayer involved in
the ruling did have an interest in the minerals in place prior
to extraction under the terms of his lease, which was merely
subject to termination on short notice,73 it was not actually
necessary for the Service to confront this issue to determine
whether an economic interest was present.
In Revenue Ruling 83-160, 7" however, the IRS appears to
have abandoned the position that, even after Swank, a tax-
payer has an economic interest only if he has, as a practical
matter, an enforceable legal interest in the minerals in the
ground prior to extraction. Revenue Ruling 83-160 modified
two prior rulings and revoked four other rulings, holding that
"terminability of a mining lease at will or upon short or nomi-
nal notice is not an essential criterion that, by itself, will pre-
clude a taxpayer from acquiring an economic interest. ' 75 In so
holding, however, Revenue Ruling 83-160 did not change the
result in either of the modified rulings, Revenue Ruling 72-
47776 and Revenue Ruling 73-32. 7 Both earlier rulings had
held that a lessee under a long term lease, terminable during
the stated term only for cause, had an economic interest.78
Nevertheless, the Service found it necessary to modify those
rulings after Swank, because both rulings relied on an analysis
of Parsons7 and Paragon Jewel Coal Co.80 criteria for deter-
mining whether the taxpayer had an economic interest, in-
71 See IRS Private Letter Ruling 8216007.
73 Id.
74 1983-2 C.B. 99.
75 Id. Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310 and Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301
were modified, while Rev. Rul. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B
179; Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B. 204 and Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205 were
revoked. See id. at 100.
76 1972-2 C.B. 310.
77 1973-1 C.B. 301.
7' See id.; Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310.
71 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
80 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
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cluding the criterion that the interest must not be terminable
at will or upon short or nominal notice.8' Accordingly, Reve-
nue Ruling 83-160 modifies the two earlier rulings to indicate
that short notice terminability was not a factor that, standing
alone, would preclude a taxpayer from having an economic
interest."2
To comport with the letter of Swank, however, Revenue
Ruling 83-160 need not have gone as far as it did. The Service
could have merely modified Revenue Ruling 72-477 and Reve-
nue Ruling 73-32 to indicate that since the leases were not
terminable without cause on less than thirty days prior no-
tice, the leases were sufficient to confer an economic interest
on the lessees. However, the Service broadly ruled that termi-
nability of a lease at will is not a criterion that will vitiate an
economic interest.8 " Applying this rule directly, the Service re-
voked Revenue Ruling 77-481. That ruling had held that a
taxpayer acquired no economic interest in minerals in place
under a lease that was coterminous with a separate contract to
supply the extracted material to a third party, where the third
party had the right to terminate the purchase contract at any
time.s4
By ruling that terminability of a lease at will does not
vitiate the economic interest otherwise conferred under the
lease, the IRS correctly interpreted Swank. In analyzing the
impact of the incentive policy underlying the percentage de-
pletion deduction on the determination of an economic inter-
est, the Court had stated: "The Government has suggested no
reason why the efficient removal of a great quantity of coal in
less than 30 days should have different tax consequences than
the slower removal of the same quantity over the prolonged
period." 5 In many instances, issues other than depletion turn
on whether the taxpayer has an economic interest in the min-
erals, and these issues may arise for years in which there has
been no extraction, or even for years before extraction com-
81 See Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301; Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310.
82 See Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99.
83 Id.
"I See Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205.
85 451 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added).
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mences8 6 Therefore, although the Court refers to removal of
"great quantities" of the mineral, the amount of mineral actu-
ally extracted should not have any bearing on whether the
taxpayer has an economic interest. Nor should the legal right
to extract a "great quantity" of mineral be determinative. The
position of the IRS that the taxpayer's interest must be of
some minimum duration was a surrogate measure for a right
to extract a significant quantity of mineral. That position,
however, was rejected by the Court in Swank. Therefore, the
impact of the statement of the Court quoted above 87 is that
the taxpayer's interest need not have as much as thirty days'
certainty of duration in order to qualify as an economic inter-
est. To attempt to draw a line somewhere between a lease ter-
minable on thirty days notice and one terminable at will
would be splitting hairs with an axe. Such a differentiation
would make significant results turn on trivial facts and would
exalt the legal form of the taxpayer's rights over the economic
substance of his rights in the mineral deposit. The well known
doctrine of substance over form has long been applied in the
determination of whether a taxpayer has an economic
interest.88
Revenue Ruling 83-160 appears to acknowledge that the
existence of an economic interest does not turn on the amount
of mineral that can be extracted. Another of the revoked rul-
ings, Revenue Ruling 74-506, had held that an economic inter-
est was conferred under a six month lease when the term of
lease was sufficient to enable the lessee to extract the entire
remaining deposit."9 The rationale behind that ruling was not
that the taxpayer could totally exhaust the deposit, but that
the interest was of sufficient duration to enable him to remove
a "substantial" amount of the mineral available. Although
" For example, only the holder of a working interest, which is necessarily an
economic interest, may deduct solid mineral mine development expenses under I.R.C.
§ 616. See IRS Private Letter Ruling 8338008 (although not specifically stated in
I.R.C. § 616, this is implied by Treas. Reg. 1.616-1(b)(4), (c) (1984)) or intangible
drilling and development expenses for oil and gas wells under I.R.C. § 263(c). See
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
"' See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
" See, e.g., Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1933).
" See Rev. Rul. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B. 178.
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Revenue Ruling 83-160 does not indicate the rationale behind
the revocation of Revenue Ruling 74-506, the logical conclu-
sion is that, after Swank, a legal right to extract any quantifi-
able amount of the mineral, however small, is not a prerequi-
site to finding an economic interest in the lessee.
In addition, the IRS revoked Revenue Ruling 74-507,
which had held that a lessee had an economic interest under a
lease that was automatically renewed for successive one year
terms each January 1, unless terminated without cause by no-
tice given ten days prior to November 1 preceding the renewal
day. 0 This ruling had essentially established a one year lease
term as a safe harbor minimum term to have an economic in-
terest in the minerals in place. Since Revenue Ruling 83-160
held that an economic interest exists even if a lease is termi-
nable at will, it would be logically inconsistent to impose any
minimum term requirement on leases.
The absence of any minimum term requirement is also
reflected in the revocation of Revenue Ruling 77-341.91 Super-
ficially, it might appear that Revenue Ruling 77-341 was re-
voked on the same logic supporting the revocation of Revenue
Ruling 77-481, but a closer examination reveals that the revo-
cation of Revenue Ruling 77-341 may be a harbinger of fur-
ther changes in the concept of economic interest. Revenue
Ruling 77-341 had held that a lessee under an oral mineral
lease which was unenforceable under the local statute of
frauds did not have an economic interest. When viewed as a
matter of substance, for purposes of determining if a lessee
holds an economic interest, a lease terminable at will and a
lease that is unenforceable under state law are not signifi-
cantly different. Whatever the subtle distinctions of property
law that may describe the two lessees' interest in the minerals
prior to extraction,92 in both cases, as against the lessor, the
90 See Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179.
91 1977-2 C.B. 204.
92 A mineral lease that is unenforceable under the statute of frauds is treated as
a license. When the mineral is severed, title passes to the licensee, but until that time,
the license is revocable. 3 AME-ICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 65, at 270. A lessee
under a tenancy at will, although holding a present possessory interest in the mineral
in place, may have his rights terminated instantly by the lessor, absent a statutorily
required notice period. 3 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1022 at 48-50 (1983).
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lessee has no enforceable rights in the mineral prior to extrac-
tion and acquires a vested right to the mineral only upon ex-
traction.9 3 Under the logic of Swank, lessees in both situations
should have an economic interest because they "are depen-
dent on the market to recover their costs, and are actually de-
pleting the mineral in place. '9 4
In contrast to the broad reading of Swank that appar-
ently underlies Revenue Ruling 83-160 when analyzing the
rights of lessees, the IRS appears to be taking the view that
the principles of Swank are strictly confined to cases involving
leases, to the exclusion of other interests that might be tested
against the definition of an economic interest. This may be
based on the language in Swank that distinguished Parsons v.
Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. on the basis that the les-
sees had a legal interest, however tenuous, in the coal prior to
extraction, where the contract miners had none.95 In Revenue
Ruling 84-160, 9 the IRS reaffirmed the principle that a con-
tract miner that is entitled to a percentage of sales, rather
than a fixed fee, as compensation for extracting the deposit
may have an economic interest. In one sense, Revenue Ruling
84-160 has a liberalizing impact. Under the facts in the ruling,
the contract miner was entitled to seventy percent of net sales
of all coal that he extracted, but was guaranteed a minimum
fee on the first 1,000 tons of coal extracted and sold. This
minimum fee would be the lesser of $22x or the net sales pro-
ceeds. In the event the contract miner received payments
under the guarantee, the excess over seventy percent of the
net sales proceeds could be recouped by the owner of the de-
posit, who retained the right to process and sell all of the coal.
Although one would think that the critical question
would be whether the guarantee vitiated the possibility that
the contract miner could have an economic interest,97 the IRS
93 For cases discussing the significance of the time at which the taxpayer's rights
in the mineral arise, see, e.g., Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25, 30
(1946); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. at 557; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 111
(1932); Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
"4 United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. at 585 n.25.
95 Id. at 583.
90 1984-25 I.R.B. 13.
97 The expected issue would be whether the minimum payment guarantee would
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did not focus on this issue at all. Because Revenue Ruling 84-
88 is terse, it is difficult to ascertain the relative significance of
the various facts, but one clearly emphasized fact was that the
contract miner had obtained an exclusive contractual right to
mine the coal deposit to exhaustion. In light of the seeming
total elimination of durational requirements for leases in Rev-
enue Ruling 83-160, this emphasis is surprising, particularly
because the distinction between leases and percentage of sales
contract mining agreements with respect to term is neither
noted nor explained in Revenue Ruling 84-88. Yet the mes-
sage seems clear. As far as contract mining agreements are
concerned, the Service continues to emphasize that duration
of the interest is significant in determining whether it is an
economic interest.9
8
run afoul of the sixth and seventh factors cited in Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 225
(1959), for denying an economic interest to contract miners, or the doctrine of Ander-
son v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940). In Parsons, among the reasons enumerated by
the Court for denying the contract miners involved in that case an economic interest
were
(6) that petitioners were not to have any part of the proceeds of the sale of
the coal, but, on the contrary, they were to be paid a fixed sum for each ton
mined and delivered, which was, as stated in Huss, agreed to be in "full
compensation for the full performance of all work and for the furnishing of
all [labor] and equipment required for the work"; and (7) that petitioners,
thus, agreed to look only to the landowners for all sums to become due
them under their contracts. The agreement of the landowners to pay a fixed
sum per ton for mining and delivering the coal "was a personal covenant
and did not purport to grant [petitioners] an interest in the [coal in place]."
359 U.S. at 225 (quoting Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 370, 372 (1937)). The nega-
tion of an economic interest by the possibility of receiving payment pursuant to a
"personal convenant" rather than as a result of an interest in the deposit can be
traced back to Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. at 404. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer who was entitled to an oil payment, payable out of either
production or the sale of the fee to the land, did jot have an economic interest be-
cause payment was "not dependent entirely upon the production of oil for the de-
ferred payments." 310 U.S. at 412. Upon examination, the method of compensation in
Rev. Rul. 84-88 violates neither of these rules. The contract miner was merely enti-
tled to a variable amount of the proceeds of production. Although his compensation
could vary, it could never exceed production. While the contract by which the pay-
ment varies might technically be a personal covenant as opposed to a property inter-
est, the very purpose of the economic interest concept is to avoid reliance on princi-
ples of property law. Therefore, the result in Rev. Rul. 84-88 is clearly correct.
98 Not only is the emphasis on a durational requirement for contract miners to
have an economic interest, when lessees apparently are subject to no such require-
ment, puzzling, but the emphasis on the right to mine to exhaustion is even more
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Similarly, it appears that the Internal Revenue Service
has not critically analyzed the application of the theory of
Swank and Revenue Ruling 83-160 to licensees. If a lessee
under an unenforceable lease is to be treated in the same
manner as a lessee under a lease terminable at will, because in
substance, if not in form, they both have the same rights to
extract the mineral, it would seem to follow that a licensee
extracting minerals under a revocable license should be eligi-
ble to have an economic interest since his right to extract the
mineral is, in substance, if not in form, the same as the right
of a lessee under an unenforceable oral lease.9 9 In fact, the
substantive rights of a lessee under an unenforceable oral
lease are more akin to the rights of a licensee than they are to
the rights of a lessee under a valid lease terminable at will.
The IRS, however, has long argued that a licensee does not
have an economic interest.100 This position does not seem to
have been altered by Swank. In L.W. Hardy Co. v. United
States, decided in 1982,101 the government argued that a li-
censee mining turquoise was not entitled to claim the percent-
age depletion allowance deduction. However, the court dis-
posed of the taxpayer's claim on other grounds and never
reached this issue.
Even after issuing Revenue Ruling 83-160, the IRS has
continued to assert that licensees lack an economic interest in
the deposit they are extracting. In its 1984 decision, Missouri
Pacific Corp. v. United States, °2 the Claims Court gave
puzzling. Prior to Parsons, the LR.S. had ruled in 1950 that a fixed fee contract miner
did have a contract that was not terminable by the owner of the deposit upon prior
notice of less than one year. G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42, declared obsolete by Rev.
Rul. 70-277, 1970-1 C.B. 280. As a result of the multiplicity of factors cited in Parsons
for denying the contract miners in that case an economic interest including the fixed
fee method of computation, as well as short notice terminability, this rule became
obsolete.
99 As a proposition of property law, an attempted lease of a mineral deposit,
which is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds because it is oral, should be held
to create a revocable license in the purported lessee. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF MNING,
supra note 65, at 270. In many instances the license may be subsequently rendered
irrevocable if the lessee (licensee) has made improvements, such as development of a
mine.
100 See, e.g., Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415 (1975).
101 1 Cl. Ct. 465.
102 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-5157 (Cl. Ct. 1984).
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Swank a narrow interpretation in denying an economic inter-
est to a license. The taxpayer in that case dredged sand and
gravel from the Missouri River.1 0 3 Under state law no specific
express grant from the state was necessary to dredge sand and
gravel from the river. Anybody was free to extract sand and
gravel without regard to riparian land ownership, and without
the payment of any royalties to the state. The taxpayer leased
a parcel of land having a small amount of river frontage and
conducted dredging operations in a several mile stretch of
river near the facility it erected on the leased land. Although
several other companies had obtained Corps of Engineers per-
mits to dredge sand and gravel in the area in which the tax-
payer conducted its operations, none of the other companies
actually conducted operations during the years in question.
In analyzing the issue of whether the taxpayer was enti-
tled to the depletion allowance, the court went back to the
beginning, citing and discussing the early cases that consist-
ently described the purpose of the depletion as an allowance
for the recovery of capital. 0 4 Although the court recognized
that despite the language of the early decisions, no capital in-
vestment, in the sense of an actual money expenditure to ob-
tain rights, was necessary, the court misperceived the broad
implications of Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co.'05
and Swank-both of which reduced the relationship of a capi-
tal investment and an economic interest to a tautology by
making the former a prerequisite for the latter and deeming
103 The taxpayer was required, however, to obtain a permit from the Army Corps
of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982)
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 § 404, 33 U.S.C. 1251 (1982).
These permits conferred no rights in the sand and gravel deposit upon the taxpayer,
but merely permitted the performance of work in navigable waters and the discharge
of fill material into navigable waters.
104 54 A.F.T.R.2d at 84-5158 to -5160. Those classic cases include United States
v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927); Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938);
Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); and Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946). For a discussion of the contribution of the failure of the
Supreme Court in these cases to recognize the changing rationale for the depletion
deduction through successive statutory amendments see McMahon, supra note 4, at
30-44.
1 0 350 U.S. 308 (1956). See note 28 supra for a brief synopsis of Southwest Ex-
ploration Co.
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the former to have been made if the latter were found to ex-
ist.106 Based on the fact that the Swank opinion quoted the
classic formulation of an economic interest from Palmer v.
Bender, the Claims Court concluded that "even in Swank the
Court did not treat the percentage depletion as a rootless and
arbitrary allowance or subsidy to mineral producers, unrelated
to the original purpose of the depletion allowance."1 7
Whether or not this correctly describes Swank depends
on whether one listens to what Swank said or examines what
it did. If one examines the facts of Swank against its holding
when simply expressed-that the taxpayer held an economic
interest-the argument that Swank effectively rewrote the
Palmer v. Bender test for an economic interest is compelling.
Palmer v. Bender was cited but subsequently ignored in
reaching the holding in Swank. Under the new test, emphasis
is on whether the taxpayer is relying on the extraction and
sale of a mineral for a profit. If he is doing so in an en-
trepreneurial capacity, however tenuous his legal relationship
to the deposit, he has met the test of an economic interest. 108
To require anything more is to ignore what Swank did, be-
cause the result in that case cannot otherwise be reconciled
with the rationale of prior cases. That Swank, from the prop-
erty interest perspective, in fact has rendered percentage de-
pletion a rootless subsidy for the extraction of minerals eligi-
ble for percentage depletion is illustrated by Revenue Ruling
83-160, which correctly interprets Swank, as applied to leases.
However, as has been discussed, to treat an unenforceable oral
lease differently from a license is to elevate words over eco-
nomic effect. 0 9 To do so defeats the very purpose of using an
economic interest test, a opposed to a legal interest test, to
determine eligibility for the depletion allowance.
Under the case law as it developed prior to Swank, some
licensees were held to have obtained an economic interest in
the mineral deposit, and others were held not to have ac-
106 See McMahon, supra note 4, at 29-30, 68.
107 54 A.F.T.R.2d at 84-5160.
108 See McMahon, supra note 4, at 70-71.
'09 See note 99 supra.
1983-84]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
quired an economic interest.110 The cases cannot be entirely
reconciled. In an early Board of Tax Appeals case, Lewis E.
Smoot v. Commissioner,111 a riparian land owner had granted
the taxpayer a nine year exclusive right to dredge sand and
gravel from a river bed. Under the controlling state law, how-
ever, the riparian land owner had merely a revocable license
granted by the state, not a title in the sand and gravel.1 12
Thus, the taxpayer, whose rights could be no greater than the
riparian land owner's, in substance, held the rights of a licen-
see under a revocable license. Making a careful and subtle dis-
tinction, the Board held the taxpayer could not deplete the
mineral deposit itself because he had no interest in it, but he
could deduct an allowance for the depletion of the fair market
value of his contractual right to dredge the deposit. 3 The
possibility that the taxpayer's rights might be terminated
through a revocation of the land owner's license did not pre-
clude the deduction, but merely affected the valuation. 4
Two modern cases, on the other hand, have allowed licen-
sees to claim percentage depletion with respect to gravel and
sand deposits extracted by taxpayers operating under licenses.
In both Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commissioner'1 5 and
Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc. v. Commissioner,"6 the tax-
payer dredged sand and gravel from a river bed under licenses
and permits from governmental authorities. Neither taxpayer
had ownership of the gravel until it was removed. Whether
the taxpayer's rights in Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. were sub-
ject to short notice termination was ambiguous at best. Al-
though the taxpayer was in that case not specifically granted
an exclusive license, it owned the only riparian land from
110 Compare Missouri River Sand Co. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. -, 1984 TAx
CT. REP. (CCH) No. 41,404 at 3432 and Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415
(1975) (no economic interest) with Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61
T.C. 407 (1974) (economic interest found) and Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. v. Com-
missioner, 32 T.C. 31 (1959).
1 25 B.T.A. 1038 (1932).
11 Id. at 1042.
113 Id. at 1045.
114 Id. at 1044.
115 32 T.C. 31.
118 61 T.C. 407.
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which dredging operations could be conducted. Applying the
principles of Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 117
the Tax Court found that the taxpayer had an economic inter-
est due to its practical, physical, and economic control over
the deposit." 8
In Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc. the taxpayer had an
even stronger case for an economic interest. Although the Tax
Court found the taxpayer to have an economic interest on the
basis of its similarity to Oil City Sand & Gravel Co., the court
also found that in Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc. the tax-
payer's rights were not terminable and were legally, as well as
physically, exclusive. The court's basis for finding that the li-
cense was not terminable is unclear. The contract between the
taxpayer and the State of Kansas was entirely silent regarding
termination by the State, although it was terminable at the
will of the taxpayer, and the court did not look at underlying
state law to determine the parties' rights regarding termina-
tion. Conversely, although the contract was silent regarding
the exclusivity of the taxpayer's rights, the court found that
the applicable state law conferred upon the taxpayer an exclu-
sive right to dredge sand and gravel from the river. 9
Both Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. and Victory Sand &
Concrete, Inc., as well as Southwest Exploration Co., on
which the decisions in those cases were based, were distin-
guished by the Claims Court in Missouri Pacific Corp. 20 Un-
like the earlier licensees, the taxpayer in the latter case did
not own the riparian land from which it conducted its dredg-
ing operations; it merely leased the land. Specifically noting
that "there is no evidence in the record that the value of the
leasehold was in excess of the amount that plaintiff agreed to
pay as rent,"' 2 ' the Claims Court concluded that the deduc-
tion for rent was an adequate allowance for the taxpayer's
costs. 12 2 Furthermore, even if the taxpayer in Missouri Pacific
117 350 U.S. 308. See note 28 supra for a discussion of this case.
118 32 T.C. at 39.
1 61 T.C. at 408, 416-17.
120 54 A.F.T.R.2d at 84-5161 to -5164.
121 Id. at 84-5161.
12 Id. at 84-5162, -5163.
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Corp. had owned the riparian land from which it conducted
its dredging operations, unlike the earlier cases, the taxpayer's
specific land was not necessary to conduct dredging. The area
of the river in which the taxpayer conducted dredging could
be dredged using other riparian parcels as a base of opera-
tions. Therefore, the taxpayer made no essential contribution
and the doctrine of Southwest Exploration Co. was not appli-
cable. 123 Although the Court of Claims distinguished both Oil
City Sand & Gravel Co. and Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc.
on two bases, the taxpayer's rights to the riparian
land-rental as opposed to ownership-and the nonexclusiv-
ity of control over the gravel deposits, only the latter distinc-
tion is significant. Even before the formulation of the concept
of economic interest, the Supreme Court had held that a
lessee of a mineral deposit was entitled to claim the depletion
allowance. 24 The heart of the Southwest Exploration Co.
doctrine is control over the extraction of the mineral deposit,
and it seems unwarranted to superimpose on it a formalistic
test that distinguishes leases from ownership. If a riparian
lessee's relationship to the deposit seems too tenuous to sup-
port depletion, perhaps the point at which the concept of eco-
nomic interest was overextended was in Southwest Explora-
tion Co. itself.
Shortly after the Claims Court decision in Missouri Pa-
cific Corp., the Tax Court reached the same conclusion on
similar facts in Missouri River Sand Co. v. Commissioner.25
Unlike the Claims Court, the Tax Court saw no need to even
mention Swank. Citing its earlier decision in Holbrook v.
Commissioner,26 denying an economic interest to the holder
of a terminable nonexclusive license, the Court acknowledged
that acquisition of an "economic interest does not require that
any money actually be invested in the minerals in place.' 27
The Court concluded that "there must exist some 'ownership'
22 Id. The court also noted that the taxpayer's investments in improvements to
land were recoverable through depreciation rather than depletion. Id. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.612-1(b)(1)(i) (1984).
24 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
22 83 T.C. -, 1984 TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 41,404 at 3432.
226 65 T.C. 415.
22 83 T.C. at -, 1984 TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 41,404 at 3435.
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on the mineral deposit 'in place' and a right to share in the
income from its production."' 28 In the instant case the court
concluded, once again, that a nonexclusive license did not con-
vey "any interest" in the minerals "in place," but rather
transferred a "mere economic or pecuniary advantage derived
from production."1 29
The taxpayer, who owned riparian land from which it
based its operations, argued that the doctrine of Southwest
Exploration Co., as applied in Oil City Sand & Gravel Co.,
and Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc. should be applied to find
that it had an economic interest in the sand and gravel that it
extracted from the river bed. Even though it made a fact find-
ing that the taxpayer had the only riparian sites suitable for
constructing a permanent base from which to conduct profita-
ble dredging operations in the segments of the river in which
the taxpayer operated, the court rejected this argument.
Those earlier cases were distinguished as involving instances
of total physical and economic control of the deposit. In the
instant case it was conceivable that a temporary dredging op-
eration could be conducted by another person.' The court
further distinguished Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc. on the
basis of the state law that granted the taxpayer exclusive
dredging rights in that case.' Accepting the Tax Court's
finding that the taxpayer in Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc.
enjoyed an exclusive legal right to extract gravel from the
river, it is clear that the taxpayers in both Missouri Pacific
Corp. and Missouri River Sand Co. had far more tenuous
rights to the gravel deposits than did Victory Sand & Con-
crete, Inc. The difference between the taxpayers' circum-
stances in Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. on the one hand, and
in Missouri Pacific Corp. and Missouri River Sand Co. on the
other, however, is far less significant.
When the fundamental difference between Missouri Pa-
cific Corp. and Missouri River Sand Co., on the one hand, and
Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. and Victory Sand & Concrete,
128 83 T.C. -, 1984 TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 41,404 at 3435.
1" Id. at -, 1984 TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 41,404 at 3435.
130 Id. at -, 1984 TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 41,404 at 3436-37.
131 Id. at __, 1984 TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 41,404 at 3438 n.9.
1983 -84]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Inc., on the other hand, is viewed as the presence or absence
of control over the gravel deposits, the issue in those cases
closely resembles that in Holbrook v. Commissioner,'32 which
the Tax Court did not reexamine in Missouri River Sand Co.
although there are superficial factual differences. In Holbrook
the Tax Court held that an economic interest was not con-
ferred on a licensee under a nonexclusive, nontransferable li-
cense to extract coal, subject to termination on ten days prior
notice. 3' Under the terms of the license, title to coal in the
ground remained in the licensor, but the licensee acquired ti-
tle to the coal upon extraction, at which time he paid a fixed
royalty to the licensor.13 4 Even though the licensee mined coal
continuously for four years, acquired title to the coal upon ex-
traction, and sold it on the open market, the Tax Court con-
cluded he had not acquired an economic interest because the
license was nonexclusive, nontransferable, and terminable
upon short notice.13 5
As is the case with Missouri Pacific Corp. and Missouri
River Sand Co., the only factor in Holbrook clearly different
from Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. is the licensee's control over
the gravel deposit derived from its ownership of the riparian
land in the latter case. If the ownership of the riparian land
was the source of its economic interest, then under the logic of
Southwest Exploration Co. its economic interest should not
have extended to all income derived from extraction of the
gravel, but only to that portion equal to the royalty that the
use of its riparian land could command from a third party.'36
132 65 T.C. 415 (1975). See also Rissler & McMurray Co. v. United States, 480
F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1973), af'g 342 F. Supp. 432 (D. Wyo. 1972). In Rissler, the court
denied an economic interest to a taxpayer who extracted sand and gravel from a city
owned gravel pit primarily for use in fulfilling the terms of a contract with the city,
but partially for sale to others pursuant to an oral agreement with the city. The tax-
payer was found to have no interest in the deposit other than for the purposes of
fulfilling the construction contract, and it was to that contract that it looked for its
profit, not the extraction of gravel. Id. at 687-88.
133 65 T.C. at 419-20.
134 Id. at 416-17.
Id. at 419-21.
136 Cf. Martin v. United States, 409 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (divid-
ing royalties received for lease of deposit and surface between that portion eligible for
I.R.C. § 631(c) and the portion treated as ordinary income subject to depletion); Mc-
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On the other hand, if exclusivity of right to extract the min-
eral is the key, the earlier gravel case is factually distinguisha-
ble from Oil City Sand & Gravel Co., as well as from Hol-
brook, Missouri River Sand Co., and Missouri Pacific Corp.
Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. had pratical, but not legal, control
of the deposit; neither Holbrook, Missouri River Sand Co.,
nor Missouri Pacific Corp. held either practical or legal con-
trol of the deposit. Before Swank, however, logic that ex-
amined practical rights to the deposit, absent a legal right,
was inconsistent with the Tax Court's analysis in the termina-
ble lease cases, which looked only at abstract legal rights and
not at the factual circumstances surrounding the actual con-
duct of the extraction of the mineral.'31 After Swank analysis
h5ased on practical circumstances and factual conduct rather
than abstract legal rights is proper. Nevertheless, a careful
analysis of Swank reveals that such a distinction between
Holbrook, Missouri River Sand Co., and Missouri Pacific
Corp., on the one hand, and Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. and
Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc., on the other hand, is not
tenable.
After Swank, and in light of Revenue Ruling 83-160, two
of the three factors cited in Holbrook as the basis for deter-
mining that a licensee does not have an economic interest
should clearly be of no relevance. Terminability, even at will,
no longer precludes an economic interest.13 Nontransfer-
ability, even when coupled with terminability, should likewise
not preclude an economic interest 39 The taxpayer with
an unenforceable oral lease in Revenue Ruling 77-341 had a
terminable nontransferable interest that was essentially
Mahon, supra note 4, at 57 (applying this analysis to Winters Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974)). But see IRS Private Letter Ruling 7905006.
137 See, e.g., Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571, 582-83 (1967).
138 See United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2
C.B. 99.
i 139 But see G.C.M. 39045, 21 Tax Notes 390 (1983) ("Based on our reading of the
Swank decision, the terminability factor, while not ... dispositive ... is still rele-
vant."); Rev. Rul. 84-88, 1984-2 I.R.B. 13 (nonterminability cited as relevant fact in




equivalent to a license, and no economic interest was found.140
If nontransferability, when coupled with terminability, results
in a denial of an economic interest, Revenue Ruling 77-341
should have been modified by Revenue Ruling 83-160 to reach
the same result on different logic, not revoked. 14' Further-
more, an enforceable written lease may by its terms be nonas-
signable. It would be difficult to assert, after Swank and Reve-
nue Ruling 83-160, that a lessee operating under an
enforceable written lease that is not assignable and is subject
to termination at will does not have an economic interest
merely because the lease is nontransferable.' 42 Such an asser-
tion would be inconsistent with the rationale of the Supreme
Court in Swank, that if the taxpayer extracting the mineral
were denied the depletion allowance, no taxpayer would be
permitted to claim a deduction for the depletion allowance.
To prevent this situation, the Court believed that the tax-
payer extracting the mineral should be found to have an eco-
nomic interest.143
Focusing on the concern of the Supreme Court that de-
pletion be allowed on all of the income from extraction of
minerals, it is reasonable to conclude that even adding the
nonexclusivity feature of the Holbrook license to the termina-
140 Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B. 204.
141 According to the IRS, revocation of a revenue ruling describes a situation in
which the position in the previously published revenue ruling has been determined to
be erroneous and the correct position is being stated in the new ruling. See, e.g.,
1984-1 I.R.B. 40. Modification of a revenue ruling indicates that the substance of a
previously published revenue ruling is being changed. Id. Thus, generally speaking,
modification is appropriate to change the rationale for reaching a particular result,
and revocation is appropriate to change the result. The intent of the IRS with respect
to Rev. Rul. 77-341, however, when measured against the above definitions of the
effects of revocation and modification, is ambiguous. Rev. Rul. 83-160 clearly revokes
Rev. Rul. 77-341, and thus indicates that it is erroneous. Nevertheless, Rev. Rul. 83-
160 fails to state any position of the IRS with respect to the factual circumstances
described in the earlier ruling. Thus, it appears that, technically speaking, the IRS
currently expresses no position for information and guidance of taxpayers on the ap-
plication of the law to the facts presented in Rev. Rul. 77-341.
142 See Rev. Rul. 70-499, 1970-2 C.B. 132, in which the IRS ruled that certain
lessees, who could assign their interest only with the consent of the lessor, held an
economic interest in the deposit. The nonassignability of the lease was apparently not
an issue. Rev. Rul. 70-449 is discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying note
145 infra.
143 See United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. at 583 n.21.
[Vol. 72
LICENSEES AND ECONOMIC INTEREST
ble nature of a licensee's interest should not prevent such a
licensee from holding an economic interest. Holbrook's licen-
sor received merely a royalty. If the licensee is denied an eco-
nomic interest, no one will be entitled to a depletion deduc-
tion with reference to the income from the sale of the mineral.
The licensor will be permitted to claim depletion, or in the
case of coal or iron ore to claim section 631(c) treatment,14 4
only with reference to his royalty income. No royalties were
payable in Missouri River Sand Co. or Missouri Pacific Corp.
Thus no one would be entitled to any amount of depletion
with respect to the sand and gravel extracted by the taxpayers
in those cases. Such a result would frustrate the policy under-
lying the percentage depletion deduction in the same manner
that denying the depletion allowance to the taxpayers in
Swank would have frustrated that purpose. Therefore, the
possible distinction between Holbrook, Missouri River Sand
Co., and Missouri Pacific Corp. on the one hand, and Oil City
Sand & Gravel Co. and Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc., on the
other hand, based upon the exclusivity of the licensee's rights,
should be irrelevant.
This is clearly so at least when the licensor of the legally
nonexclusive licensee in fact grants no other licenses. It is dif-
ficult to give weight to the argument that in distinguishing
Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co., the Swank
Court intended to inject into the test for an economic interest
an element that requires legal rights to any amount of the
mineral in the ground, as opposed to a de facto right to ex-
tract the mineral. After distinguishing the contract miner case
from Swank on the basis of legal rights in the deposit, the
Court went on to conclude in Swank that the course of con-
duct of the parties rather than abstract legal rights evidenced
the relationship of the lessees to the deposit. Therefore, if
such a licensee extracts minerals, acquires title to the ex-
14 Under LR.C. § 631(c), the lessee of a coal or iron ore deposit treats royalties
received under the lease as amounts realized from the sale of a § 1231 asset subject to
capital gains treatment if the royalties are received more than one year after the les-
sor acquired his interest in the deposit. The lessor's cost basis of the allocable portion
of the coal to which the royalties relate will be allowed as a deduction in computing
gross income, but no depletion allowance deduction is permitted. See generally Cog-
gin, Disposition of Coal Interests: Section 631(c), 29 TAx LAW. 95 (1975).
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tracted mineral by virtue of extraction and the payment of a
royalty, and is free to sell the mineral so produced on the
open market, the licensee should have an economic interest
and, accordingly, should be entitled to the depletion allowance
deduction.
Even if the licensor has granted other licenses, such as
was the case in Missouri Pacific Corp., it does not necessarily
follow that a licensee who exploits the deposit should not have
an economic interest. Nonexclusivity of the taxpayer's right to
exploit the deposit has not always been rigidly applied to
deny a taxpayer an economic interest in a deposit that he was
extracting for sale on his own behalf. In Revenue Ruling 70-
499,145 "several" lessees jointly and severally leased oyster de-
posits from a state agency. Under the lease the rights of the
group of lessees were exclusive as against any other person,
unless a majority of the lessees voted to allow others to dredge
for oyster shells within the leased deposit; but, within the
group of lessees, no lessee had any exclusive rights. The rights
of all lessees were identical; each could dredge oyster shells
from any portion of the leased premises; the only restriction
on the location of an individual lessee's selection of a site for
dredging operations was a minimum separation requirement.
Title to oyster shells passed to the lessees only upon
extraction.
In holding that each of the lessees held an economic in-
terest in the oyster shell deposits, the Service described the
rights of the lessees as "exclusive." Such a characterization is
chimerical. Among themselves, no lessee had any right to a
minimum quantity of oyster shells or to exploit a specific por-
tion of the deposit. To preserve his rights to obtain title to
any of the oyster shells, each lessee was compelled to com-
mence operations, and operations could be temporarily sus-
pended only at the risk of reducing the proportion of the de-
posit to which the particular operator could ultimately acquire
title. Such rights can hardly be called exclusive as a matter of
substance. At best, because a majority of the lessees could bar
the granting of rights to any additional lessees, these rights
145 1970-2 C.B. 132.
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might be described as limiting the lessor's ability to unilater-
ally dilute the interest of the group of lessees. The same can-
not be as easily said with respect to licensees. Whether a i-
censee has an economic interest, however, should not turn on
this gossamer factual distinction.
Both a licensee and any one lessee under a lease of the
type described in Revenue Ruling 70-499 are unable to ascer-
tain the number of units of mineral they have an uncondi-
tional vested right to extract. If there is any rational basis for
tying the existence of an economic interest to exclusivity of
rights, it is to enable the taxpayer to determine the number of
units of mineral yet to be extracted, and thus form the basis
for computing cost depletion.'4" The logic of Swank, however,
is grounded in the allowance of percentage depletion. No such
computation is necessary in order to allow percentage deple-
tion, and therefore, the inability to compute cost depletion,
because the number of units of mineral that the taxpayer may
extract cannot be computed, should not preclude the taxpayer
from claiming percentage depletion. Therefore, he should be
found to have an economic interest. This is bootstrap logic at
its finest, but then so was Swank.
The conclusion that licensees should have an economic
interest is reinforced by comparing a licensee to a percentage
of sales contract miner. In Ruston v. Commissioner,147 the
Tax Court held that a contract miner, who was to receive a
specified percentage of the net profits realized by the lessee
holding an operating interest, had an economic interest.148 Al-
though the contract miner in Ruston had the exclusive right
to extract the coal and his right was not terminable on short
notice, the miner never actually acquired title to any of the
coal. Title both before and after extraction was lodged in the
lessee with whom the miner had contracted. Nevertheless, the
contract miner and the lessee were each entitled to claim per-
"' Under Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a), cost depletion is determined by dividing the
adjusted basis for the mineral property at the end of the year by the sum of the units
sold during the year and the number of units remaining (including units extracted
but not sold) at the end of the year, and multiplying the result by the number of
units sold during the year.
17 19 T.C. 284 (1952). See also Brown v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 58 (1954).
148 19 T.C. at 297.
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centage depletion on their respective shares of the sales pro-
ceeds of the extracted coal. Although Ruston predated Par-
sons v. Smith,4 ' as reflected by Revenue Ruling 84-88,
Ruston is undoubtedly still good law. 150
If a percentage of sales contract miner who never obtains
title to the mineral has an economic interest, it would be to-
tally anomalous to hold that a licensee who extracts, obtains
title to, and sells the mineral does not have an economic inter-
est. It is untenable to distinguish the two based on exclusivity
of the nature of their respective rights to extract the coal. In
Swank the Court concluded that the depletion allowance,
which hinges on an economic interest, should be available
"whether the entire operation is conducted by one taxpayer
over a prolonged period or by a series of taxpayers operating
for successive shorter periods."' 51 If that is so, there is also
little reason to make the entitlement to the deduction turn on
whether the extraction is conducted by several taxpayers si-
multaneously or successively, as long as each taxpayer is enti-
tled to a share of the market price of the coal that he extracts.
Such is clearly the case with a licensee.
This conclusion finds further support in the en-
trepreneurial risk theory of entitlement to an economic inter-
est and, accordingly, to the depletion allowance deduction,
first accepted in Douglas Coal Co. v. Commissioner.'52 That
case involved a lessee who had entered into an agreement to
sell all of the mine output to the lessor under a long term
contract. 153 In resolving whether the taxpayer was a true
lessee or a contract miner, the court examined the application
of the factors considered in Parsons v. Smith to determine
whether the taxpayer had assumed entrepreneurial risks with
249 359 U.S. at 215. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra for a discussion of
the Parsons case.
150 See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra for a discussion of Rev. Rul. 84-88,
1984-25 I.R.B. 13. See also IRS Private Letter Ruling 8216007; McMahon, The Coal
Depletion Allowance Deduction, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 581, 594-99 (1982). But see Utah
Alloy Ores v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 917 (1960).
151 451 U.S. at 585.
152 429 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 325.
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respect to the coal."" Although in earlier cases involving fact
patterns similar to Douglas Coal Co. the Tax Court had never
applied an entrepreneurial risk analysis,155 after Swank the
Tax Court appears to have accepted the validity of the en-
trepreneurial risk theory of entitlement to an economic inter-
est. In O'Connor v. Commissioner" 6 the Tax Court applied a
risk analysis to determine whether the taxpayer had retained
an economic interest as a lessor, and thus had received ordi-
nary income subject to depletion, or had sold a clay deposit in
place and would thus be entitled to capital gains treatment of
receipts in excess of the basis allocable to the deposit. In the
course of holding the taxpayer had retained an economic in-
terest the court stated "[e]conomic interest, percentage deple-
tion, and risk . . . are inextricably related."'57 The taxpayer
was found to bear the requisite risk because the lease did not
obligate the lessee to remove any certain quantity of clay. The
O'Connors "continued to share in the risks of production and
thus were required to look solely to production to recover
their capital."' 58
Although the O'Connor opinion utilizes a risk analysis it
is not clear how far the Tax Court will carry this type of anal-
ysis. Unfortunately, in O'Connor the Tax Court continued to
cloud the resolution of the economic interest issues by refer-
ring to the need for the taxpayer to look to the extraction and
sale of the mineral "to recover [the taxpayer's] capital."'1 59 In
its statement that risk was inextricably tied to economic inter-
est the court said: "Risk exists when one must look solely to
extraction of a mineral resource in order to recover an invest-
ment. .. ."1'1 Even though it has acknowledged in Missouri
River Sand Co. that an actual money investment in the de-
posit is not a prerequisite for an economic interest, it is
154 Id. at 334-38.
"' See, e.g., Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957 (1969); Boiling v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 754 (1962). See also Thornberry Constr. Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d
346 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
25- 78 T.C. 1 (1982).
157 Id. at 11.
158 Id. at 17.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 11.
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doubtful that the Tax Court would readily apply an en-
trepreneurial risk analysis to find that a licensee has an eco-
nomic interest. A licensee not only has no "investment" in the
mineral in place, and thus no capital to recover, but neither
does he have "ownership" or "control" which were said in
Missouri River Sand Co. to be the basis for finding an eco-
nomic interest. It appears that at least one of these three ba-
ses for claiming an economic interest is necessary in the Tax
Court.
However valid these prerequisites may have been before
Swank, they are not valid after Swank. As the Tax Court it-
self has acknowledged, continued reference to the need for an
investment is clearly erroneous."'
Nevertheless, even if O'Connor is shorn of the language
seemingly requiring an investment, since an investment is
clearly not necessary, the Tax Court might conclude that risk
analysis is, nevertheless, appropriate only where there is an
actual investment, since otherwise the taxpayer has not placed
anything at risk. This too would be incorrect, as is illustrated
by Douglas Coal Co. and by Swank, both of which involved
lessees. 6 2 Neither case involved an actual investment by the
lessee in the mineral deposit, which in the case of a lessee
would be the payment of a lease bonus, 63 yet both cases ap-
"" Missouri River Sand Co. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. ., 1984 TAx CT. REP.
(CCH) No. 41,404 at 3432. See also United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. at 585 n.25.
162 451 U.S. at 573; 429 F. Supp. at 324-25.
163 A lessee must capitalize lease bonus payments rather than deduct them or
exclude them from income. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(3). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.613-
2(c)(5)(ii).
Mine development expenses are currently deductible by the holder of an operat-
ing interest under I.R.C. § 616 and, therefore, the lessee has no "tax investment" in
the mineral deposit, although he does have an economic investment that can be re-
covered only through production.
Although mine exploration expenditures are also currently deductible under
I.R.C. § 617(a), due to the recapture provisions of I.R.C. § 617(b), a lessee who has
incurred exploration expenditures would have a "tax investment" that may be recov-
ered only through depletion deductions allowed with respect to extraction. It is
doubtful, however, that either a lessee with rights as tenuous as a lease at will or a
mere licensee would incur any significant exploration expenses. Furthermore, if a
lessee or licensee were to be found not to have an economic interest, an expenditure
that otherwise would be capitalized into the depletable basis of the mineral deposit
under I.R.C. § 612, would probably be deductible under I.R.C. § 162. See Boiling v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 754 (1962) (cost of acquisition of surface rights by contract
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plied a risk analysis.164 While Douglas Coal Co. might be dis-
tinguished on the grounds that the lease was not terminable
on short notice, 6 5 Swank cannot be so distinguished. The risk
to taxpayers in Swank was not incurred with respect to the
mineral in place, but with respect to recovering the costs of
extracting the mineral.166 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
still concluded that the activity in which the taxpayers in
Swank were engaged was the type of activity for which Con-
gress intended the depletion allowance to provide an incen-
tive, since the taxpayers were actually depleting the mineral
in the ground.16 7 In this light, the lessees in Swank are no dif-
ferent than many licensees. Therefore, the requirement of an
actual investment to show risk, which might be used to limit
the extension of the entrepreneurial risk analysis, should not
be imposed. Similarly, the Swank decision on its face obviates
the necessity of "ownership" as a prerequisite for an economic
interest, leaving only "control" of the three bases that the Tax
Court has required. As has already been discussed, a careful
miner was deductible under I.R.C. § 162; court declined to apply Commissioner v.
Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956) (discussed in note 28 supra) to find
an economic interest). Accord Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 249 (1971),
rev'd, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974) (Southwest Exploration Co. applied to facts simi-
lar to Boiling).
164See 451 U.S. at 585; 429 F. Supp. at 335-38.
"
6See 429 F. Supp. at 337.
16451 U.S. at 585 n.25. In contract miner cases and pre-Swank lessee cases in-
volving leases subject to termination on short notice, courts consistently rejected any
notion that the payment of development expenses or expenditures for depreciable
plant and equipment to be used in the extraction process was an investment in the
mineral deposit itself. See, e.g., Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. at
628 (contract drift miners bore expenses of constructing tipple, power line, railroad
siding and spurs, and road, as well as purchases of processing equipment); Elm Dev.
Co. v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1963) (contract drift miner constructed
roads and benches, the costs of which were currently deductible); United States v.
Stallard, 273 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1959) (contract strip miner expended between $20,000
and $25,000 to construct roads); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 939
(3d Cir. 1959) (contract miner agreed to construct all roads and buildings necessary
for the mining, removal and transportation of the coal to railroad cars); Commis-
sioner v. Hamill Coal Corp., 239 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1956) (contract strip miner con-
structed tipple and roads); Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957, 962 (1969) (drift
miner bore all development and mining costs including opening the mines, building
supporting structures, such as fan houses, powder houses, transformers, coal tipples,
shoring and roads).
16I Id. at 576, 584-85.
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reading of Swank reveals that the decision cannot be recon-
ciled with a "control" theory of entitlement to an economic
interest, but only with an entrepreneurial risk theory. 6 '
There is a final aspect of terminable leases and operating
rights, such as licenses, to which neither Swank nor Revenue
Ruling 83-160 directly speaks, but which is noted in G.C.M.
30945.169 Swank dealt with unexercised rights to terminate a
lease. 17 0 Revenue Ruling 83-160 states that "terminability...
is not an essential criterion that, by itself, will preclude a tax-
payer from acquiring an economic interest."' 7 ' G.C.M. 39045
states that it is not clear from Swank whether terminability
has been removed entirely as a factor, concludes that termina-
bility, while not controlling, is still a factor, and declares that
Revenue Ruling 83-160 "may go one step too far in its conclu-
sion." 172 This suggests that Revenue Ruling 83-160 has re-
moved terminability entirely as a factor. The question will
eventually arise as to whether terminability will nullify an
otherwise valid economic interest if the lease or license is in
fact terminated. Once again, the policy underpinnings of
Swank dictate that the lessee or licensee under a terminated
lease or license should, nevertheless, be considered to have
held an economic interest for the period prior to the termina-
tion. Although it is true that among the reasons for the
Court's rejection of the Government's argument in Swank was
that it would be unfair to deny the depletion deduction to a
taxpayer "who did in fact conduct a prolonged and continuous
operation," simply because there was a risk of termination,173
the Court also grounded its conclusion on the absence of any
rational basis for linking the right to a depletion deduction to
the period of time that the taxpayer operated a mine. 1 4 A
thoughtful reading of Swank reveals that the implementation
of the policy that the Supreme Court believes lies behind the
percentage depletion allowance requires that a taxpayer be al-
168 See text accompanying notes 92-94, 108-109 supra.
169 21 Tax Notes at 390.
170 451 U.S. at 573.
" Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-43 I.R.B. 6.
17' 21 Tax Notes at 391.
173 451 U.S. at 584.
14 Id. at 585.
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lowed depletion whenever he has extracted the mineral and
shared in the sales proceeds. To take into account the fact
that the lease or license was terminated would improperly re-
turn to the concept rejected in Swank that the taxpayer must
have some continuing future interest in the minerals while
they are in the ground and not merely the right to extract
them. Therefore, when the issue arises, the IRS and the courts
should acknowledge that actual termination of the lease, as
well as the possibility of termination, does not preclude an ec-
onomic interest in the lessee for the period of time that he
exercised rights under the lease. Similar treatment should be
accorded to licensees.
CONCLUSION
The concept of economic interest has developed slowly.
The Swank decision arose from an issue that was fueled by
the decision in Parsons v. Smith over twenty years earlier.
During the intervening period, there was great debate regard-
ing whether short notice terminability automatically pre-
cluded an economic interest. Conservative conventional wis-
dom taught that short notice terminability was a fatal flaw.
After many years Swank told us that this was not so. As is
always true of significant pronouncements by the Supreme
Court, the Swank decision will have its fallout. Revenue Rul-
ing 83-160 is merely the beginning.
The next logical step is the acknowledgement that licen-
sees generally should be treated the same as lessees. The re-
fusal of the Claims Court in Missouri Pacific Corp. and the
Tax Court in Missouri River Sand Co. to do so is inconsistant
with the logic of the decision in Swank. It is true that both of
those cases presented a fact pattern in which, before Swank,
it would have been inconceivable to allow the taxpayer the de-
pletion allowance. Swank, however, must be viewed either as
reshaping the theory on which the concept of economic inter-
est turns or as an erroneous decision that overextended the
concept of economic interest. Before Swank, there was a clear'
test. Myriad legal interests in a mineral deposit could be de-
nied an economic interest due to the absence of economic con-
trol over the exploitation of a significant quantity of the de-
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posit. After Swank it is difficult logically to distinguish those
interests from the lessees in Swank, who in fact held no eco-
nomic control over the deposit.
Unless the result in Swank is to be reversed, the logic of
the policy orientation of Swank dictates that other reconsid-
erations of the scope of the concept of economic interest are
appropriate. First, the suggestion of Revenue Ruling 84-
88-that for a percentage of sales contract miner to have an
economic interest he must have an exclusive right to extract
the deposit for a substantial length of time-should be recon-
sidered. It is difficult to distinguish a percentage sales con-
tract miner, particularly if he has exclusive operating rights,
from a lessee under a terminable lease. If the lessee processes
the mineral himself, his gross income from mining may be
greater than that of the percentage of sales contract miner.
But if the lessee sells raw mineral, aside from the influence of
the tax system, the respective gross incomes of the lessees and
percentage of sales contract miner should be approximately
the same. For the reasons previously discussed in the context
of licensees, it should also make no difference whether a per-
centage of sales contract miner has exclusive or nonexclusive
rights. If his income is dependent upon extraction and sale of
the mineral, if he has incurred entrepreneurial risks with re-
spect to the extraction of the deposit, and if he has a legal
right to extract minerals, he should have an economic interest.
I have suggested previously that the logic of Swank may
also justify a reversal of the rule of Parsons and Paragon
Jewel Coal Co.17 5 Perhaps that will some day come to pass,
but there is yet no sign of it. Neither Revenue Ruling 83-160
nor Revenue Ruling 84-88 is itself a harbinger of that change,
and the case for allowing an economic interest to fixed fee
contract miners is somewhat different from that of licensees
and percentage of sales contract miners. Nevertheless, there is
need for an expansive reexamination of the linchpins on
which an economic interest turns. If a lessee under an unen-
forceable lease may have an economic interest, as far as oper-
ating interests are concerned, conducting the extraction with
1275 McMahon, supra note 4, at 67-80.
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the legal right to participate in the proceeds of sale, however
measured should also guarantee the existence of an economic
interest, without regard to examination of the underlying
property law rights upon which the taxpayer relied as the ba-
sis for his right to extract the mineral.17
Extending Swank to its logical conclusions, as has been
done here raises the question of whether Swank itself was cor-
rectly decided. It is logically difficult to allow the lessees in
Swank an economic interest and to deny it to licensees such
as were involved in the Holbrook and Missouri Pacific Corp.
and Missouri Sand & Gravel Co. decisions. But it is not so
easy to say that Congress intended that the incentive of the
percentage depletion allowance deduction be extended to
licensees. Percentage depletion originated as an administra-
tively convenient substitute for discovery value depletion.1 7
Under the theory of discovery value depletion it was impera-
tive that the taxpayer have the legal right to extract a sub-
stantial portion of the mineral in the ground. In rejecting the
argument of the IRS in Swank, the Supreme Court failed to
examine adequately and critically the historical development
of the percentage depletion allowance deduction. Instead it
viewed percentage depletion as if it had sprung forth, full
grown in one burst of legislation, and, finding that the policy
was to encourage the exploration, development and extraction
of minerals, allowed the deduction to taxpayers based solely
on extraction. Despite the assertion of the Claims Court in
Missouri Pacific Corp., following the logical implications of
Swank, the percentage depletion allowance is largely rootless.
In substance it requires only that the taxpayer derive income
dependent upon the extraction of the deposit. It may be that,
if Congress were considering the enactment of percentage de-
pletion anew, such a broad application would be intended, but
that is not so clear when one examines the historical develop-
ment of the depletion allowance.
17' This would not change the result in cases such as Commissioner v. Estate of
Donnell, 417 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1969), which held that the operator of a well, who
illegally slant drilled to an oil deposit under land of another person, does not have an
economic interest. See id. at 109, 112.
7 McMahon, supra note 4, at 30-36.
1983-84]

